

## BETWEEN "HOMEWORLD" AND "ALIENWORLD": WALDENFELS ON INTERCULTURALITY

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### INTRODUCTION

The tension between globalization and localization is increasingly obvious in our age. We see, on the one hand, that European countries are more than ever willing to merge into one cross-country organization, but, at the same time and on the same continent, we witness the separation of ethnic and cultural groups in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. In respect of economics, the expansion of international companies is vividly present, whereas the protest against globalization is also everywhere heard. So far as culture is concerned, the triumph of universalism is always accompanied hand in hand by contextualism and relativism. If you allow me to focus on the current situation in my homeland of Taiwan, we see that ethnic and cultural problems are at their height. "Are you Chinese or Taiwanese? With which do you identify yourself?" The importance of such questions is more than just academic, since they touch the concerns of ordinary people and have had a great impact on politics. It is undoubtedly worth taking up these questions seriously. Where is my ethnic and cultural identity? Do I have to choose between alternatives or can the answer be multiple? How should I treat the differences between me and the other as well as between my group and other groups? Does ethnic and cultural authenticity have prime authority? Can a self-centered nationalism provide us with the best solution to the problem?

These questions are not unknown in phenomenology for Husserl has taken them up by introducing notions such as "homeworld" (*Heimwelt*), "alienworld" (*Fremdwelt*), and "the one world" (*die eine Welt*).<sup>1</sup> In the present essay, I propose to deal with such a cultural problematic in the framework of the phenomenological thinking of the contemporary phenomenologist

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Bernhard Waldenfels. Based on the Husserlian concepts of homeworld and alienworld, Waldenfels presents intercultural phenomena as the intertwining relationship between cultural groups. Here, I will explore Waldenfels' cultural discourse by bringing up, first his analysis of "the other" (*das Fremde*), and then his conceiving of interculturality as the intertwining relationship between homeworld and alienworld. The distorted form of such a relationship through "appropriating the other" (*Aneignung*) and the consequence of this distortion will be discussed as well.

### THE ANALYSIS OF THE OTHER

When we consider the problem of the other, the self is inevitably involved. Generally speaking, the other is viewed as that which is excluded from the realm of the self. In the broad sense, the self is characterized by belongingness (*Zugehörigkeit*), intimacy (*Vertrautheit*), and availability (*Verfügbarkeit*). In concrete terms, it denotes my body, clothes, bed, department, friends, children, generation, homeland, vocation, and so on. The problem now is, how is the contrast of self and other to be understood? Is it like the shell and core? Or is it like the fore and the rear, the front and the back? Waldenfels uses the Husserlian discourse of experiencing-the-other (*Fremderfahrung*) to discuss this problem.

According to Waldenfels, what is essential in the discourse of Husserl's question about the other is not "What is the other?" or "How can I get access to the other?" Instead, he asks about the way the other presents itself. That is to say, in Husserl's mind there is no such independent other who exists objectively no matter whether he is experienced by me or not. He insists that the other is determined by the way in which he is accessed. Besides, the other presents itself only in a paradoxical manner: "the verifiable accessibility of what is not originally accessible."<sup>2</sup> Waldenfels points out that the Husserlian discourse of the other is based on the postulates of intersubjectively mutual effect (*intersubjektive Wechselwirkung*), mutual understanding (*Verständigung*), the given basis of commonness (*das vorgegebene Boden der Gemeinsamkeit*), and most crucially, the contrast of the self and the other.<sup>3</sup> The distinction of the self and the other is, so to speak, self-evident.<sup>4</sup>

The paradoxical form of the other, "the verifiable accessibility of what is not originally accessible" is interpreted by

Waldenfels as lively absence (*leibhaftige Abwesenheit*), which is inspired by Merleau-Ponty's conception of the other, as the latter understands the other as the elsewhere itself, instead of as staying in elsewhere.<sup>5</sup> The other cannot be defined solely in a negative way; it is, then, not just "what remains to be known." The other is closely related to the present by way of withdrawal (*Entzug*), just like memory, which is no longer in presence. It nevertheless retains its impact on the present. Waldenfels says: "The experiencing-the-other does not mean that there exists something inaccessible in contrast to something accessible. We see clearly from the Husserlian definition of the other that the moment someone escapes from us, it presents itself."<sup>6</sup>

An adequate understanding of the other does not necessarily presuppose a pure "my own sphere" (*Eigenheitssphäre*), because we not only encounter the other in other persons, we encounter it in us as well. There exists, that is, the otherness in ourselves and in our cultures, which has to do with intersubjective otherness (*intersubjektive Fremdheit*) and intercultural otherness (*interkulturelle Fremdheit*) respectively. The otherness in us lies not in dark corners; it is instead vividly present. Waldenfels uses the following examples to show this: my birth being given and my name being given. These two happenings seem to stay in the far past, the past that never comes back again. Yet, they are present almost at every moment of my life. What if my life had never been given? What if I had not had been given a name? I came into the world through my birth and am known through my name. But the beginning of my life and my being known through name-giving is never part of my memory, "of myself," "of my consciousness in the strict sense." I am myself, but this self is never clear to me. Waldenfels refers to the experience of looking at a photo of oneself from the past. He wonders, can I recognize myself as myself? Is this person not someone foreign to me, with whom I can hardly identify myself?<sup>7</sup>

It follows that the other does not exist somewhere beforehand; it originates in "drawing the line." The other is thus always relative. When we draw a line, we have to stand on one of the side of it, just like when we make a difference between genders – it is impossible for us not to stand on either the male or female side. That is, we can never assume a third gender to distinguish the genders. The same holds that we are never able to stand outside any culture to compare cultures.<sup>8</sup> Our involvements are unavoidable

each time we make any kind of distinction. The other never comes by itself; there is never "the other in itself" that waits for me to get in touch with him or her. The other is other only when we draw the line between self and the other, and I always have to take a side to stand on.

Waldenfels treats the other, on the one hand, as relational – just as we think of the right and the left. Since there is never a right side in itself, there is never an other in itself, either. The other is always established through a kind of order, just as the right or the left has no meaning without relating to some standpoint. The other is never localized somewhere, it is instead the result of the establishment of a certain kind of order. An order, once established, will determine what belongs to it and what not; anything that does not belong to this order is excluded as outside, as other.

Yet, on the other hand, Waldenfels apparently lays upon the other a more fundamental significance; it is in itself the origin of the establishing order. The other is that which we respond to, and to establish order can be seen to be one way of responding. The latter, in return, decides what is inside and what is outside – that is, it thus contributes to the commonly understood meaning of the other, which is in contrast to the self. The other, thus understood, can be described as the other of the second order, which is otherwise from the "primordial other."

As we have seen above, the other is treated as the second self, to which the term "alter ego" refers. But the "primordial other" is never the second self. It is what pushes us to speak and to take action. It is also the original force to distinguish the other from the self. In short, it cannot be viewed as belonging to any order at all. That which inspires the establishment of order is not to be put into that order in reverse. And the other never allows itself to be put into the saying about the other. We make mistakes sometimes when we think, "the saying about the totality is in itself the saying by totality."<sup>9</sup> But regrettably the significance of the other has not been fully recognized, and has been treated now and then as the second self; it is inscribed in a certain order and its significance is just omitted. The reason for its oblivion is that the other is not easy to recognize, as long as we do not pay enough attention. The other presents itself only in the form of calling. On this point Waldenfels explains: "The other is not something determinate, it is what awaits the response – and nothing more."<sup>10</sup>

The other is that which is calling for response; even the

avoiding attitude is a kind of response, and the self is defined in this context accordingly as "responding to the calling." Even though easily omitted, the other is detected everywhere, because "the other penetrates all our experiences."<sup>11</sup>

The other may be also confused with the third (*das Dritte*). The so-called third person presents itself usually in the form of an anonymous judge. The "neutral" third person also claims the validity of his or her judgments in terms of "truth," "law," "consciousness," or "intentional meaning." As long as the other, with whom I am communicating, claims that his intentions are universally valid, then it is highly probable that he is assuming the role of the third person. The consequence would be that the "I" and the "other" may replace each other by way of an exchange of perspectives. As long as people do that, the dialogue between them will be transformed very quickly into a monologue, and the consequence is that "otherness" evades and gives place to "commonness."

One may agree that there is always a third that is involved in an I-other relationship. But it does not mean that the third stands in this relation from the very beginning. It has its origin instead in a certain discourse; it comes from a certain corner rather than nowhere. Correspondingly, that "universalization" also originates from somewhere. It is the result of some kind of discourse. Waldenfels says emphatically that modern Europeans used to assume "the standpoint of universality" (*Gesichtspunkt des Universalien*), but they blindly turned it into "the universal standpoint" (*universaler Gesichtspunkt*). This latter standpoint leads to the "pressure of universalization" (*Universalisierungszwang*), which pushes the self and the other under its compulsion. The so-called universal value of human rights and justice is the result of a kind of order, and it has a certain kind of injustice as its inevitable by-product.<sup>12</sup>

The other is completely different from the third and, as we have already seen, it presents itself only in the form of calling (*Anspruch*). For Waldenfels, the calling of the other is as essential as chasing happiness is in Aristotle, as self-preservation in Spinoza, as the categorical imperative in Kant, and as absolute freedom in Sartre.<sup>13</sup> We have, so to speak, no other choice in front of the other; we cannot but respond to its calling. It is so primordial that we do not have any other premises when we respond to it.

That which inspires our speaking and action cannot be put into speaking and action in return. It shows itself only in an indirect way. The attraction of alien culture and the other gender is also

similar. People can only respond to this attraction by being involved or escaping from it. In no way can we talk about it or make it as a theme of our speaking. Waldenfels deems it as the play of the truth (*Spiel der Wahrheit*), which cannot be put in the framework of the duality of truth/falsehood or good/evil. The equalizing of the self and the other is very much like the equalizing of now and past, life and death. The other, that is, never allows of any dissolving in any frame of order.

### THE INTERTWINING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CULTURES AND THE DISTORTION OF THIS RELATIONSHIP

In dealing with homeworld and alienworld, Husserl points out that the homeworld denotes the normal lifeworld of "my fellow people." It is characterized by cognitional and behavioral norms shared by people who belong to that group. These norms are developed throughout generations, so that for Husserl, the alienworld is different from the homeworld because the alienworld has no common ancestors. Besides, since long traditions shape specific cultural characteristics for each culture, we may conclude that there is a cultural difference between homeworld and alienworld. Husserl believes that such difference in cultures can be overcome by "the one world" (*die eine Welt*), which is seen to be the common basis for all homeworlds.

Waldenfels points out that Husserl's discourse about the homeworld and alienworld is ambiguous. He stresses, on the one hand, the obvious distinction of homeworld and alienworld but, on the other hand, he brings up "the one world" to abolish this differentiation. In the eyes of Waldenfels, the consequence of this ambiguity is the oblivion of the otherness of the alienworld. Waldenfels suggests that the relationship may be reinterpreted as intertwining (*Verschränkung*). He denies the existence of any independent culture; he also denies the egocentric way of treating other cultures. From his point of view, this is exactly the way Husserl treats the relationship between European culture and other cultures.<sup>14</sup>

Contrary to Husserl, the other is the key notion for Waldenfels in his discourse about homeworld and alienworld. As indicated above, traditionally the other is treated as the non-self, the other than self, or that which does not belong to self; it refers to an unclear domain contrasting to the clear domain of "I." And this

unclear domain is that which waits to be recognized, overcome or even conquered.<sup>15</sup>

In modern Europe, beginning with Descartes, the subject is in the center of philosophical discourse. In respect of ethnic problems, then, nationalism is put in a central place. In addition, Eurocentricism is also obvious in dealing with the relationship between European culture and other cultures. Under such circumstances, the distinction between self and other, homeworld and alienworld, is taken for granted. I am purely I, and the other is purely the other. However the relationship between the other and I is never symmetrical. Asymmetry results from the fact that people always look at the other or other cultures from their own point of view. The other is consequently depreciated as the non-self. It is merely treated in the negative sense.

We have seen above that, according to Waldenfels, the other is spread all over our experiences. The experiencing-the-other, in Husserl's terms, is but one example. The relationship between homeworld and alienworld can be seen to be another typical example. The way Waldenfels criticizes the Husserlian discourse of experiencing-the-other is also obvious in his critical attitude towards the latter's discourse of intercultural relationships. He contends that myself is full of otherness; the self is not penetratingly clear at all. We see above that the giving of my name, with which I identify myself, proceeds without my participation. Such inner otherness indicates that, between the self and the other, there is an intersection which makes the interaction between me and the other possible.<sup>16</sup> The way Waldenfels interprets interculturality is similar to his way of interpreting intersubjectivity. The otherness in homeworld and alienworld co-constitutes the between-worlds (*Zwischenwelten*), which contribute to the intertwining relationship between different worlds. The between-worlds also constitute the basis of the mutual understanding between cultures.

On the basis of calling and response (*Anspruch-Antwort*), Waldenfels indicates a paradox in intercultural relations: every culture has to be grateful for its response to the other, no matter whether this other stems from inside or outside. Waldenfels writes:

The response involves listening to the voice of the other, but it is not obedience, because our response is creative rather than just repeated.<sup>17</sup>

That which we respond to and have to respond to is not under our control, and it is not out of our free invention.... Any pure own culture (*reine Eigenkultur*) is a culture that does not respond any more, it repeats only the answer that it already has or just the variations.<sup>18</sup>

Generally speaking, people used to undermine the cultural difference between the self and other (my own group and the other group) by way of "appropriating the other" (*Aneignung*) or "giving up to the other" (*Enteignung*). The consequence is the sacrifice of other cultures. According to Waldenfels, the meaning of "inter" in the intertwining relationship of homeworld and alienworld should never be sacrificed by any "arrogant single culture" (*angemaßte Monokultur*), nor should it be sacrificed by the contrary move. The *Aneignung*, in the strict sense, is sort of sticking to the borderline between cultures, whereas the *Enteignung* means the abolishing of the borderline. They both want to escape from what Waldenfels calls the dizzy "borderline-play" (*Grenzspiel*).

Such borderline-play is the true origin of intersubjectivity and interculturality. It helps to bring about the discursive models and norms (*diskursive Mustern und Normen*) that make possible communication and interaction between cultures.<sup>19</sup> The original understanding of language can be taken as an example in this context. Waldenfels contends that the mutual understanding among cultures through language is made possible from the outset because it is based on phonological symbolism, which is encountered from culture to culture. For example, "mal" indicates "being grand," whereas "mil" indicates "being tiny." Without such a kind of original understanding of language, we could hardly explain how people from totally different cultures can begin to understand each other and why children always have access to the language of the adults, as well as why normal persons can communicate with psychotic patients.<sup>20</sup>

So far as the debate of cultural relativism and universalism is concerned, Waldenfels points out that both positions have something in common – that is, they compare their own cultures with those of the other. Waldenfels emphasizes that no significant comparison between cultures and life forms is possible as long as we take our own standpoints for granted. The asymmetrical attitude is almost unavoidable each time we make comparisons, just because we can hardly stand outside our own culture. The Husserlian



discourse about intercultural relationships may provide us with a typical example.

How do homeworld and alienworld relate to each other for Husserl? On the one hand, he acknowledges the basic difference between them; it is therefore not unimaginable for people to encounter shock and amazement from other groups. On the other hand, however, Husserl introduces the "fundamental ground" (*fundamentale Grundsicht*) to undermine this difference as well as the shock and amazement.

The Husserlian notion of the one world is the result of the expanding of the homeworld. Such a self-centered idea neglects the intertwining phenomena between cultures and the intersecting between-worlds. Husserl's discourse is based on the assumption that the other is nothing but secondary to me, and the communication between self and other presumes the priority of self over the other, and moreover this priority is strengthened by the commonness proposed by me. The idea of "one world" – understood as the first ground and the last horizon – fits perfectly this role of commonness.

Waldenfels is opposed to Husserl on this point; he thinks that Husserl displays what Waldenfels calls the attitude of *Aneignung*. The appropriation of the other, as Waldenfels describes it, means the use of rationality as an instrument to conquer and possess the other. In Waldenfels' view, Europeans alone have assumed this attitude towards the other cultures. It is based not only on ethnocentrism, which is usually visible in many cultures, but also on logocentrism, the focal point of which is reason. Inherent in reason is the potential to equalize everything and to advocate a common aspect. The consequence is that nothing remains unfamiliar. Although Europeans encounter others and deal with others, they seldom let others express themselves.<sup>21</sup> This is the typical position that Europeans have held. If we understand the attitude of *Aneignung* adequately, we will not be surprised by the fact that modern Europeans were so enthusiastic about colonizing other ethnic and cultural groups. They considered themselves to be the representatives of universal reason, and it was their vocation to conquer "foreign" lands (*fremdes Land*), be it through military power or a civilizing method.<sup>22</sup>

Husserlian discourse about intercultural relationships reveals that he sticks to the bias of the western tradition. For him, Europe is not just a geographical name; it is the embodiment of rationality. The "ideal lifestyle and mode of being"<sup>23</sup> are completely revealed

on this continent. This is a kind of Eurocentrism which encompasses ethnocentrism and logocentrism.<sup>24</sup> Waldenfels interprets this Eurocentrism also as a "philosophical Eurocentrism," which begets the miracle that "starts from the self, goes through the other and ends in totality."<sup>25</sup> Modern Europeans have made use of reason as an instrument to conquer and possess the other. The meaning of the other has never been taken up as a serious topic in this Eurocentric way of thinking.

According to Husserl, Europeans have inherited the spirit of ancient Greece; they make the world their home and, in turn, they consider their home to be the world. Any non-European who wants to do as Europeans do, just has to learn from Europeans. European culture has assumed a cross-cultural and cross-ethnic attitude and become the guard of the "common world" (*Gemeinwelt*).<sup>26</sup> All other cultures can find a place in the hierarchy or system of orders created by Europeans. Compared to European culture, these cultures are considered to be more or less irrational, and it should surprise no one if we witness the collapse of a certain culture because it contains too many irrational factors.<sup>27</sup>

Frankly, then, the so-called "common world" is nothing but the expansion of "my own world" (*Eigenwelt*). The frame of this world, although extended, remains nevertheless within its own horizon. The misery of this way of thinking is that Europeans consider their own culture as the culture of cultures and never allow any place for deviations.<sup>28</sup> By contrast, the "between-worlds," as Waldenfels conceives of them, are completely different, because they retain the basic characteristics of "my own world" and "the other world." Interculturality should never be dismissed by any single culture, especially from the perspective of any homeworld. The notion of lifeworld is also reinterpreted in this context by Waldenfels as the intertwining area of homeworld and alienworld, instead of being the horizon of a certain homeworld.<sup>29</sup>

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

Husserl once said very clearly that

There is something unique here that is recognized in us by all other human groups, too, something that, quite apart from all considerations of utility, becomes a motive for them to Europeanize themselves even in their unbroken will to spiritual self-

preservation; whereas we, if we understand ourselves properly, would never Indianize ourselves, for example.<sup>30</sup>

This statement reveals the Eurocentric attitude of Husserl and it also expresses quite clearly what Waldenfels calls *Aneignung*. That modern Europeans engaged in colonization and imperialism during the last several centuries in the name of reason is a historical fact that no one can deny. Today Europeans may regret much about what their ancestors have done to the globe, especially concerning the disappearance of many "primitive cultures." Europeans have changed the world, and this change has been handed down to us, in this new century, with good aspects as well as bad. This past is not yet over, since we are still witnessing the responses to this past history in war, terrorism and so forth. The non-European and the non-Westerner have to ask themselves a question: What next? Should remorse about the disappearance of their original culture continue to affect their attitude toward the West – and even themselves? Should they adopt from the West an imperial attitude towards other cultures/countries?

The solution lies, I believe, in one's attitude toward the other; this attitude has to be considered reflectively and seriously. Let me return to the questions about globalization and localization mentioned in the Introduction. We might wonder, are they necessarily in conflict with other? The same issue applies to the question about my homeland: is to be Taiwanese and Chinese necessarily self-contradictory? Based on the idea of interculturality proposed by Waldenfels, we might find an alternative solution that is better than any we have had.<sup>31</sup>

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#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Authors such as Klaus Held and Anthony Steinbock, together with Waldenfels, have interpreted these Husserlian concepts from their own perspectives. See my paper "Lifeworld, Cultural Difference and the Idea of Grounding," in *Space, Time and Culture*, ed. David Carr and Chan-Fai Cheung (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004).

<sup>2</sup> Edmund Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen und*

*Pariser Vorträge* (Husserliana I) (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950), p. 144. [See *Cartesian Meditations: an introduction to phenomenology*, trans. Dorion Cairns (M. Nijhoff: The Hague, 1960), p. 114].

<sup>3</sup> Bernhard Waldenfels, *Topographie des Fremden: Studien zur Phänomenologie des Fremden I* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1997), p. 24.

<sup>4</sup> "die Fremdheit ist durch die Art ihrer Zugänglichkeit bestimmt" See Waldenfels, *Erfahrung des Fremden in Husserls Phänomenologie*, in *Profile der Phänomenologie: Zum 50 Todestag von Edmund Husserl*, ed. Wolfgang Orth (Freiburg [Br.]/München: Alber, 1989), p. 48.

<sup>5</sup> "Das Fremde ist nicht einfach anderswo, sie ist das Anderswo, und zwar eine 'originäre Form des Anderswo'," Waldenfels, *Topographie des Fremden*: 26; see also Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Das Sichtbare und das Unsichtbare* (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1986), p. 320.

<sup>6</sup> Waldenfels, *Topographie des Fremden*, p. 29

<sup>7</sup> Waldenfels, *Topographie des Fremden*, p. 30.

<sup>8</sup> Waldenfels, *Topographie des Fremden*, pp. 19-21.

<sup>9</sup> Waldenfels, "Verschränkung von Heimwelt und Lebenswelt," in *Philosophische Grundlage der Interkulturalität* (Studien zur interkulturellen Philosophie, Bd. I), ed. R. A. Mall and D. Lohmar (Amsterdam – Atlanta: Rodopi, 1993), p. 62.

<sup>10</sup> Waldenfels, *Topographie des Fremden*, p. 180.

<sup>11</sup> Waldenfels, *Topographie des Fremden*, p. 180.

<sup>12</sup> Waldenfels, *Topographie des Fremden*, p. 125.

<sup>13</sup> Waldenfels, *Topographie des Fremden*, p. 121.

<sup>14</sup> Waldenfels, *Topographie des Fremden*, p. 150.

<sup>15</sup> Waldenfels, *Topographie des Fremden*, pp. 59-60.

<sup>16</sup> Waldenfels, *Topographie des Fremden*, p. 156.

<sup>17</sup> Waldenfels, "Verschränkung von Heimwelt und Lebenswelt," p. 64.

<sup>18</sup> Waldenfels, "Verschränkung von Heimwelt und Lebenswelt," pp. 63-64.

<sup>19</sup> Waldenfels, *Der Stachel des Fremden* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1990), p. 68.

<sup>20</sup> Waldenfels, *Der Stachel des Fremden*, p. 69

<sup>21</sup> The American political scientist Fred Dallmayr once described the way Europeans dealt with the American Indians after Columbus "discovered" the new continent, as follows: "the Spanish

authors speak well of the Indians, but with very few exceptions they do not speak to the Indians." (*Beyond Orientalism: Essays on Cross-Cultural Encounter* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), p. 7) and "According to Todorov, the Spanish-Indian confrontation was a failed encounter from the start, because it was predicated on two alternative strategies: either complete assimilation or complete rejection and subjugation. These two alternatives, he muses, are not confined to the Spanish conquest but are the prototype of the behavior of 'every colonist in his relation to the colonized' down to our own days." (Dallmayr, *Beyond Orientalism*, p. 6)

<sup>22</sup> Waldenfels, *Der Stachel des Fremden*, p. 63.

<sup>23</sup> Edmund Husserl, *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis, aus Vorlesungs- und Forschungsmanuskripten 1918-1926*, ed. Margot Fleischer [Husserliana XI] (Den Haag: M. Nijhoff, 1966), p. 320.

<sup>24</sup> Waldenfels, *Topographie des Fremden*, p. 49.

<sup>25</sup> Waldenfels, "Verschränkung von Heimwelt und Lebenswelt," p. 61.

<sup>26</sup> Husserl, *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie: Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie*, ed. Walter Biemel [Husserliana VI], (Den Haag : M. Nijhoff, 1954) pp. 320, 336. [See Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, trans. David Carr (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970).]

<sup>27</sup> Waldenfels, "Verschränkung von Heimwelt und Lebenswelt," p. 61.

<sup>28</sup> Waldenfels, "Verschränkung von Heimwelt und Lebenswelt," pp. 61-62.

<sup>29</sup> Waldenfels, *Topographie des Fremden*, p. 41.

<sup>30</sup> Husserl, *Die Krisis* [Husserliana VI] p. 320 [Carr, tr., p. 275].

<sup>31</sup> Abstract: The problematic of culture, with a focus on the intercultural relationship, is investigated in the framework of Waldenfels' phenomenological thinking. Beginning with Husserl's discourse of experiencing-the-other (*Fremderfahrung*) and the relationship between "homeworld" (*Heimwelt*) and "alienworld" (*Fremdwelt*), he denounces the ego-centric position of Husserl and proposes to make clear the original meaning of "the other" (*das Fremde*). The intertwining relationship between self and other, the

"homeworld" and the "alienworld," which is advocated by Waldenfels, will be made clear in my paper. The distorted form of such an intertwining relationship through appropriating the other (*Aneignung*) as well as the consequence of this distortion is also explored.